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RAY HARDING, JR., et al., 
Defendants/ Appellees. 
Case No. 20020240-CA 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS - APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal comes within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (Supp. 2002). On July 15,2002, it 
was transferred to this Court by the Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§78-2 
2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Entry of a judgment, even by default, is never a ministerial matter. Plaintiff 
failed to state a claim for relief against the defendants for Judge Harding's decision not to 
grant her default judgments. 
This issue was not raised in the trial court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: While this issue was not raised in the trial court, 
this Court can affirm the decision of the trial court on this related, alternative, ground. 
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Buehner Block Company v. UWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988); State 
v. South. 924 P.2d 354, 355 n.3 (Utah 1996). 
2. Plaintiffs claims against the defendants are an attempt to collaterally attack the 
decisions of Judge Harding in a prior action and are therefore impermissible. 
This issue was not raised in the trial court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: While this issue was not raised in the trial court, 
this Court can affirm the decision of the trial court on this related, alternative, ground. 
Buehner Block Company v. UWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988); State 
v. South. 924 P.2d 354, 355 n.3 (Utah 1996). 
3. In her first amended complaint, plaintiff sought to add new claims and causes of 
action that were not set out in either her original notice of claim or her original complaint. 
The trial court correctly dismissed these claims for lack of jurisdiction. 
This issue was raised by the defendants' motion to dismiss. R. 472-76. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the 
defendant's motion to dismiss. Because this issue raises only a question of law, the Court 
gives the trial courts' ruling no deference and reviews it under a correctness standard. 
Zion's First National Bank v. Fox & Co.. 942 P.2d 324, 326 (Utah 1997). 
4. The defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. 
This issue was raised by the defendants' motion to dismiss. R. 470-72. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the 
defendant's motion to dismiss. Because this issue raises only a question of law, the Court 
gives the trial courts' ruling no deference and reviews it under a correctness standard. 
Zion's First National Bank. 942 P.2d at 326. 
5. Plaintiffs claims against Judge Harding are barred by res judicata. 
This issue was raised by the defendants' motion to dismiss. R. 468-70. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the 
defendant's motion to dismiss. Because this issue raises only a question of law, the Court 
gives the trial courts' ruling no deference and reviews it under a correctness standard. 
Zion's First National Bank. 942 P.2d at 326. 
6. Plaintiffs claims against Deputy Clerk Tronier are barred by collateral 
estoppel. 
This issue was not raised in the trial court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: While this issue was not raised in the trial court, 
this Court can affirm the decision of the trial court on this related, alternative, ground. 
Buehner Block Company v. UWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988); State 
v. South. 924 P.2d 354,355 n.3 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 Claim against state or its employee - Time for 
filing notice. (Supp 2002) 
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, 
or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
attorney general within one year after the claim arises, or before the expiration of 
any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not 
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
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Rule 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Default 
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is 
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules 
and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment 
for the amount claimed and costs against the defendant if: 
(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear; 
(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person; 
(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and 
(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can 
be made certain by computation. 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by 
default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to 
enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or 
to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any 
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the 
court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems 
necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may 
likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule 
apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a 
third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or 
counterclaim. In all cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations 
of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by 
default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or 
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by 
evidence satisfactory to the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Holli Lundahl brought this action on April 13,2001 against Judge Ray Harding, Jr. 
R. 1-199. On July 31,2001, Judge Harding filed a motion to dismiss. R. 208-49. This 
motion was based on judicial immunity and res judicata (relying upon the dismissal of a 
prior action brought by the plaintiff against this defendant). R. 242-45. Rather than 
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respond to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on October 
5,2001. 258-430. 
In her first amended complaint, the plaintiff added a second defendant, Deputy 
Clerk Mike Tronier. R. 428-30. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the first 
amended complaint on October 26,2001. R. 431-484. The trial court granted the motion 
to dismiss on December 10,2001. R. 580-82. Plaintiff filed a Rule 59 motion to correct 
the judgment on December 27, 2001. R. 585-93. The trial court denied this motion on 
February 20,2002 (entered on February 22, 2002), and signed the formal judgment 
dismissing this action as to both defendants on the same date (also entered on February 
22,2002). R. 594-97. On March 19,2002, the plaintiff filed her notice of appeal. R. 
611. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In their motion to dismiss the first amended complaint, the defendants did not 
challenge the factual claims made in that document. 
On June 4,1999, plaintiff filed a lawsuit against nineteen defendants, including 
Empire of American Realty Credit Corporation (Empire), Source One Mortgage Services 
Corporation (Source One), and CNA Insurance Company (CNA) alleging tortious 
interference claims. R. 428 (case no. 990402021 - Fourth District Court). Lundahl 
obtained default certificates against Empire, Source One, and CNA from defendant 
Tronier in that action. R. 426. Judge Harding then held a hearing on September 23,1999 
on Lundahl's request for default judgments. At the hearing, Judge Harding set aside the 
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defaults against CNA and Empire. Subsequently, on October 12, 1999, Judge Harding set 
aside the default against Source One. R. 422-25. 
Judge Harding granted a motion to dismiss case no. 990402021 as to CNA on 
January 25, 2000. R. 419-22. On March 7, 2000, Judge Harding ruled that Source One 
had been improperly served. R. 419. 
On April 12,2000, Lundahl brought an action against Judge Harding claiming that 
he had violated her civil rights by setting aside the default judgments against CNA, 
Empire and Source One in the prior litigation. R. 453-64 (case no. 000401252). On 
November 15, 2000, Judge Trevort issued an order dismissing that action with prejudice 
on the basis of judicial immunity. R. 441. On appeal, this Court affirmed the dismissal of 
the plaintiffs claims against Judge Harding. R. 437-38, a copy is attached to this brief as 
Addendum A. 
On April 24, 2000, plaintiff filed a notice of claim against the defendants. R. 431-
35. But in her first amended complaint, the plaintiff added allegations against the 
defendants relating to alleged conduct involving a separate lawsuit pending before Judge 
Howard of the Fourth District Court. R. 406-7, 418. These allegations were not 
contained in her original notice of claim. In opposing the dismissal of her first amended 
complaint (which was filed on October 5, 2001), the plaintiff submitted a second notice of 
claim dated August 8,2001 which did contain notice of these new claims, but was served 
well after the filing of the present lawsuit. R. 526-35. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Holli Lundahl claims that Judge Harding and his clerk, Mike Tronier, should have 
granted her default judgments against certain defendants in a prior lawsuit. The entry of a 
default judgment is not a ministerial act. Judgment, even by default, can only be entered 
when the well-pled facts of the complaint state a valid legal basis for granting judgment 
to the plaintiff. Plaintiff cannot state a valid claim against the judge, or his clerk, for 
judicially denying her a default judgment in a prior action. 
Plaintiffs claims are also fatally defective in that she seeks to collaterally attack 
judicial decisions in a prior action that have not been overturned or brought into question 
in any manner. 
The trial court was without jurisdiction over plaintiffs other claims, raised for the 
first time in her amended complaint, because they were not presented in her timely filed 
notice of claim. A second notice of claim, only filed after this lawsuit was commenced 
and less than 90 days before the filing of the first amended complaint, did not correct the 
jurisdictional defect. 
Both defendants are entitled to judicial immunity. Plaintiffs claims against Judge 
Harding are also barred by res judicata based on the dismissal of her prior suit against the 
judge. Plaintiffs claims against Mike Tronier are also barred by collateral estoppel based 
on the dismissal of the same prior action. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANTS 
Throughout her first amended complaint and her opening brief, plaintiff treats the 
entry of a default judgment as if it were a ministerial act that she was entitled to have the 
defendants perform. This misstates Utah law. 
Judgments by default are not favored by the courts nor are they in 
the interest of justice and fair play. No one has an inalienable or 
constitutional right to a judgment by default without a hearing on the 
merits. The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, where 
possible, a full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits of 
every case. 
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin. 14 Utah 2d 60, 62, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (1962) (footnote 
omitted). 
Default judgments are not ministerial in nature, but are judicial decisions similar to 
any other judicial decision. Under Utah law it is not enough that a defendant has failed to 
appear. The plaintiffs claims must still be adequate to entitle her to judgment, a 
discretionary decision that must be made by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer. 
We do not agree that Smith's failure to appear entitled Pennington to 
a default judgment. Under rule 55, a defendant's failure to appear warrants 
an entry of default but does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to a default 
judgment. Even though a defendant fails to appear, a plaintiff is entitled to 
default judgment "only if the well-pled facts show that the plaintiff is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Likewise, "[t]he uncontroverted 
allegations of the complaint must be sufficient on their face to establish a 
valid claim against the defaulting party." 
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Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 973 P.2d 932,940 (Utah 1998) (citation and footnote 
omitted); see also Skanchv v. Calcados Ortope SA. 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998) 
(even if a defendant defaults, "a court may grant relief only if a valid legal basis 
supported by well-pled facts is asserted in the complaint."). 
Because the decision of whether or not a default judgment should be granted is a 
discretionary judicial one, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the defendants. 
Deputy Clerk Tronier provided the plaintiff with default certificates. Whether or not the 
plaintiff was entitled to actual default judgments in a prior proceeding entails a 
discretionary judicial determination that cannot be the grounds for a separate lawsuit 
against the judge and his clerk who made these decisions. The trial court's dismissal of 
this action should be affirmed because the plaintiff failed to state a claim against the 
defendants. 
II. LUNDAHL CANNOT COLLATERALLY ATTACK DECISIONS 
MADE IN PRIOR LAWSUITS 
The entirety of Lundahl's action against the defendants is an effort to relitigate 
issues and decisions from prior lawsuits because she does not agree with the results 
achieved in the previous proceedings. If the plaintiff can bring an action against a judge 
for a decision that is still valid and final, a unique opportunity is created for inconsistent 
decisions. To succeed in this action, Lundahl would have to convince the court that 
Judge Harding's prior decisions were erroneous. And yet the trial court would then be 
placed in the quandary of providing monetary or equitable relief against the defendant 
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judge, but without having authority to alter the decisions that are alleged to be erroneous. 
"[T]he judge of one division of the same court cannot sit as an appellate court and 
overrule another judge." Johnson v. Johnson, 560 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Utah 1977). Even if 
the order in question is interlocutory in nature, a fellow judge cannot set it aside. 
Harward v. Harward. 526 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Utah 1974); State v. Morgan, 527 P.2d 225, 
226 (Utah 1974) ("District Judge cannot overrule another acting District Judge having 
identical authority and stature."). In Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT 
77, 52 P.2d 1267, the court ruled that a plaintiff who failed to appeal or otherwise attack a 
trial court's decision could not normally collaterally attack that decision in a new action. 
In Heck v. Humphrey. 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States Supreme Court 
adopted such a rule for challenges to criminal proceedings (including writs of habeas 
corpus) brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose 
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on 
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state 
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a 
federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A 
claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that 
has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. 
Id. at 486-87 (emphasis in original). 
Defendants urge this Court to hold that a plaintiff can not state a cause of action 
when the judicial decisions she challenges have not been reversed or otherwise 
invalidated or brought into question. To do otherwise would permit actions, such as the 
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current one, in which a litigious party can continually seek to relitigate the same issues. 
Lundahl previously sued Judge Harding, seeking to collaterally attack his decisions in her 
prior lawsuit. R. 453-64. Having lost that matter in the trial court, and on appeal (R. 437-
41), she then filed this action (adding Judge Harding's clerk as a new defendant) in a 
further attempt to challenge Judge Harding's judicial decisions that she disagrees with. 
These lawsuits have been commenced even though the challenged decisions have 
not been reversed, overruled or otherwise brought into question. The very same reasons 
that led the United States Supreme Court to not permit the use of § 1983 actions as a 
method of collateral attack to a valid criminal conviction suggest that Utah should not 
permit such ongoing collateral attacks against a trial court's decisions. If such decisions 
are in error, they can be challenged on appeal or by extraordinary writ. Defendants ask 
this Court to affirm the dismissal of this action on the grounds that plaintiff cannot state a 
claim against a judge, or his clerk, for alleged errors injudicial decisions when those 
decisions have not been overturned or otherwise brought into question. 
III. PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE A NOTICE OF 
CLAIM CONCERNING HER ALLEGATIONS OF INTERFERENCE 
WITH AN ACTION BEFORE JUDGE HOWARD DEPRIVED THE 
COURTS OF JURISDICTION OVER THIS CLAIM 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act governs the procedure for suing the State 
of Utah, its agencies, and its employees. Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court 
have held that the filing of the notices of claim required by the Act is a jurisdictional 
precondition to filing any suit against the state or its employees. Lamarr v. Utah State 
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Dep'tofTransp.. 828 P.2d 535, 540-42 (Utah App. 1992); Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County. 1999 UT 36, ^ 18, 977 P.2d 1201; Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 249-50 
(Utah 1988). Full (strict) compliance with the requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act is essential to maintain a cause of action thereunder. Lamarr. 828 P.2d at 
540-42; Rushton. 1999 UT 36,1J19; Scarborough v. Granite School District. 531 P.2d 
480,482 (Utah 1975). 
At the relevant time, the Governmental Immunity Act required that: 
[a] claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope 
of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim 
is filed with the attorney general within one year after the claim arises . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (Supp. 2002) (in part). The Utah Supreme Court has held 
that the requirement of filing a notice of claim is very broad and applies comprehensively 
to many types of actions. 
The Immunity Act defines injury as "death, injury to a person, damage to or 
loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, 
or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his 
agent." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(5). The language "any other injury that 
a person may suffer," in addition to the generalized enumerated categories 
listed in the definition indicates an intent to draw a broad net over the 
multitudinous harms that plaintiffs might allege against government 
officials. 
Thomas v. Lewis. 2001 UT 49, T[19, 26 P.3d 217 (court without jurisdiction to consider 
statutory forfeiture claim due to plaintiffs failure to file a notice of claim). 
While the plaintiff filed a notice of claim before commencing this action, it only 
gave notice that she would bring an action concerning claims that she was wrongfully 
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denied default judgments in a prior proceeding before Judge Harding. R. 431-35. No 
mention was made of any claim concerning attempts by the defendants to improperly 
interfere with a completely different lawsuit being heard by Judge Howard. These claims 
were made for the first time in the first amended complaint. R. 413-18. Defendants 
moved to dismiss these claims due to the plaintiffs failure to raise them in her notice of 
claim. 
The courts are without jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs new claims because they 
are beyond the scope of the notice of claim that was filed. The notice did not articulate 
any intent to bring such claims. Because they are beyond the scope of the notice of claim 
that was filed, the trial court correctly dismissed these claims for lack of jurisdiction. 
Stralev v. Hallidav. 2000 UT App 38, ffl[12-17 , 997 P.2d 338 (failure of timely filed 
notice of claim to include claim that individual acted with fraud or malice was a 
jurisdictional defect for which the suit was properly dismissed: "A proper notice of claim 
must be filed to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction."); Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 
1129 (Utah 1990) (suit is barred on any cause of action not within the scope of the notice 
of claim filed); White v. Heber City. 82 Utah 547, 26 P.2d 333, 335 (1933) (causes of 
action for damages not raised in first, timely, notice of claim were not properly before the 
court); Sweet v. Salt Lake City. 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167, 1172 (1913) ("What we do 
hold, however, is that where the claimant seeks to recover for a different item or element 
of damages, as in this case, he cannot do so for the reason that such item or element is not 
described or referred to in the original claim presented to the city council"). 
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Regardless of whether the defendants may be entitled to immunity, the plaintiff 
was still required to provide notice of his intent to bring such a suit. In Hall v. Utah State 
Department of Corrections. 2001 UT 34, 24 P.3d 419, the court expressly held that the 
substantive immunity of the state did not protect it from lawsuits under the Whistleblower 
Act. Id. at Tf 18. But even though substantive immunity did not apply, the court upheld 
the dismissal of the action on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the 
procedural requirement that he file a notice of claim before filing his action. Id at ^[21-
27. In reaching this decision, the court stressed the very real and important purposes that 
the notice of claim requirement fulfilled. Id at ^[22-23 (prevent payment of spurious 
claims, permit government ample opportunity to examine into both the cause and extent 
of the injury). 
This Court reached the same conclusion in rejecting a plaintiffs argument that he 
was not required to file a notice of claim because there was no substantive sovereign 
immunity applicable to his cause of action. 
However, Nielson confuses the scope of the notice requirement with the 
extent of substantive sovereign immunity protection. Complying with the 
notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act is a jurisdictional 
requirement and a precondition to suit, and is in no way co-extensive with 
the substantive provisions contained within the Governmental Immunity 
Act which insulate the sovereign and its operatives from liability. 
Nielson v. Gurlev. 888 P.2d 130, 135 (Utah App. 1995) (emphasis in original). 
Lundahl seeks to avoid the consequences of her failure to raise these new issues in 
her timely notice of claim by relying on a second notice of claim dated August 8, 2001, 
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well after this action was filed and less than 90 days before the first amended complaint 
was filed. R. 526-35. But in HaH, the court made it clear that "[o]nly after the state has 
had the opportunity to consider the claim for ninety days is suit against the government 
allowed/' IdL at ^22. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court, in Hall determined that the filing 
of the notice of claim on the same day that the complaint was filed was a fatal 
jurisdictional defect that required the dismissal of the action. Id. at [^26 (action can only 
be filed after claims have been denied by government). 
Lundahl's reliance on her August 8, 2001 notice of claim is erroneous. This 
second notice of claim was filed over four months after this action was commenced. The 
defendants and the State of Utah never had an opportunity to consider these new claims 
before the action was filed. Nor can the existence of the first amended complaint make 
these claims timely. The first amended complaint was filed on October 5, 2001, less than 
90 days after the date of the second notice of claim. Plaintiff failed to show that this 
second notice of claim was ever denied. Therefore, even if the filing of an amended 
complaint could undo the jurisdictional failure to timely file a notice of claim before 
commencing an action, the timing of the second notice of claim is still defective. The 
first amended complaint was filed before the second notice of claim was statutorily 
denied at the end of 90 days. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14 (1997). For these reasons the 
trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs new claims should be affirmed. 
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IV. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST JUDGE 
HARDING, AND DEPUTY CLERK TRONIER ARE 
BARRED BY ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 
Plaintiffs claims against the defendants are based on Judge Harding's denial of 
Lundahl's sought for default judgments in a prior court action. Mike Tronier issued the 
default certificates that the plaintiff sought (R. 426), but Judge Harding ruled that she was 
not entitled to judgments against certain parties based upon their alleged defaults. R.419-
26. The only challenged conduct was performed by Judge Harding in his judicial 
capacity, i.e., considering motions made to the court and rendering decisions on matters 
before that court. The first amended complaint alleges no actions by the defendants other 
than that they made decisions that were contrary to the wants and desires of the plaintiff. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that judicial immunity is 
essential to the orderly functioning of our judicial system. Pierson v. Ray. 386 U.S. 547, 
554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217 (1967). 
In Stump v. Sparkman. 435 U.S. 349, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978), a § 1983 action was 
brought against a state court judge who approved a petition for sterilization without a 
proper hearing or notice, contrary to state law. The Court noted that, because some of the 
most difficult questions with which a judge must deal pertain to jurisdiction, "the scope of 
the judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the 
judge." Stump, 98 S. Ct. at 1105. The Court held that a judge could be deprived of this 
immunity only if he/she acted in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." The Court found 
the judge in question to be immune from suit because he was performing a judicial act. 
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Although he proceeded informally, (1) he was performing a function normally performed 
by a judge, and, (2) he had dealt with the parties in his judicial capacity. Stump, 98 S.Ct. 
at 1106-1108. The state court judge was therefore absolutely immune from suit, even if 
the actions taken by him were in error. 
In Mireles v. Waco. 112 S. Ct. 286 (1991), the Court reaffirmed its prior holdings 
and reiterated that: "Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on 
occasion, 'it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration 
of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to 
act upon his convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.'" 
Id. at 287 (citations and footnote omitted). 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also recognized that judges enjoy absolute 
immunity for judicial functions so that courts may function without harassment or 
intimidation. Christensen v. Ward. 916 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1990); VanSickle v. 
Hollowav. 791 F.2d 1431, 1434-35 (10th Cir. 1986). 
In the present case Judge Harding was acting in his capacity as a Fourth District 
Court Judge of the State of Utah at all times and in all of the activities that plaintiff claims 
violated her constitutional rights. Judge Harding was within his jurisdiction, performing 
functions normally performed by judges, and dealing with the parties in his official 
capacity as a Utah District Court Judge. Certainly Judge Harding was not acting in the 
"clear absence of all jurisdiction" when he reached the challenged decisions. 
17 
Defendant Mike Tronier, as a court clerk, is entitled to that same judicial 
immunity. This defendant, as an agent and servant of the State of Utah's Fourth District 
Court, is entitled to absolute judicial immunity because his actions were integral parts of 
the judicial process. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983). Utah has long 
followed this rule. Absolute judicial immunity will be provided to all individuals who 
perform integral parts of the judicial process where such immunity is needed to "protect 
functions intimately related and essential to the judicial decision-making process." Parker 
v. Dodgion. 971 P.2d 496, 498 (Utah 1998) (court-appointed psychologist entitled to 
absolute judicial immunity); Black v. Clegg. 938 P.2d 293, 297 (Utah 1997) ("Thus, 
Clegg as Bar president and Baldwin as Bar executive acting as clerk of the disciplinary 
court are immune from suit."); Bailey v. Utah State Bar, 846 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1993) 
(quasi-judicial immunity extended to all participants in attorney disciplinary proceeding). 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that "[c]ourt clerks, like judges, are 
entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights actions for damages when performing 
tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process. This protection from suit has also 
been extended to administrative officials who perform duties that are functionally 
equivalent to those of a court clerk." Ambus v. Utah State Bd. of Educ 858 P.2d 1372, 
1380 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). In Ambus, the court held that an administrative 
officer was entitled to absolute immunity for determining at what address to send the 
plaintiff notice of a scheduled hearing. Id at 1381. 
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In Wiggins v. New Mexico State Supreme Court Clerk, 664 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 
1981), the Court held that court clerks or other judicial servants and agents could not be 
sued because of their part in the court's discharge of its judicial functions. 
Furthermore, we fully agree with this language contained in 
Blouin v. Dembitz, 367 F.Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd. 
489 F.2d 488 (2nd Cir. 1973): 
Statutes and ruling case law protecting state judges in the 
discharge of their functions may not be circumvented or 
vitiated, by pretending to maintain this suit also against their 
"clerks, servants and agents11 for no court can discharge its 
judicial duties without the aid of clerks, servants and agents. 
Wiggins, 664 F.2d at 815. The plaintiffs claims against Mike Tronier all relate to the 
fact that he was Judge Harding's clerk. No action of his, other than his employment by 
that court is alleged as being improper.1 There is no allegation that he did anything more 
than act as the servant and agent of his court in this action. His actions were integral parts 
of the judicial process and the trial court was correct in dismissing this action based on his 
being entitled to absolute immunity. 
V. LUNDAHL'S CLAIMS AGAINST JUDGE 
HARDING ARE BARRED BY RES JUDICATA 
Lundahl has previously sued Judge Harding, claiming that his decisions in a prior 
lawsuit were wrong. R. 453-64. The factual allegations in that prior action are the same 
as those presented in the present matter. That action was dismissed and the dismissal was 
1
 Tronier is alleged to have provided the default certificates requested by the 
plaintiff, but is somehow to be held liable for Judge Harding's decisions that denied 
Lundahl the default judgments she desired. The only other allegations against Tronier 
relate to the claims over which the trial court had no jurisdiction. 
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affirmed on appeal. R. 437-41. The plaintiffs attempt to sue Judge Harding a second 
time is barred by res judicata. 
A long line of Utah court decisions has held that the doctrine of res judicata bars a 
party from seeking to relitigate not only matters litigated in a previous lawsuit, but any 
matter that could have been litigated between the parties in the prior action. Peterson v. 
Peterson, 645 P.2d 37 (Utah 1982); Bradshaw v. Kershaw. 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 1981); 
International Resources v. Dunfield. 599 P.2d 575 (Utah 1979). 
In In Re General Determination of Rights to the Use of all Water, Murdock v. 
Springville Municipal Corp.. 1999 UT 39 fl6, 982 P.2d 65, the court explained that for 
res judicata (or claim preclusion): 
to apply, a party must prove the following: (i) both cases must involve the 
same parties, their privies or assigns; (ii) the claim sought to be barred 
either must have been presented or have been available to be presented in 
the first case; and (iii) the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment 
on the merits. 
The plaintiff (Holli Lundahl) and the defendant (Judge Harding) are the same in both 
actions. Lundahl either did, or could have, presented all claims against Judge Harding in 
her previous action. The first action was dismissed, which dismissal was affirmed by this 
Court on appeal. All three elements of res judicata/claim preclusion have been met. Res 
judicata barred the plaintiffs efforts to once again litigate these issues that she lost in her 
prior lawsuit and the trial court's dismissal of this action should be affirmed on appeal. 
In an effort to avoid the bar of res judicata, plaintiff claims that she could not have 
brought her state law claims in her prior action because she had not yet received a denial 
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of her notice of claim. Nothing prevented the plaintiff from waiting the requisite time to 
permit her notice of claim to be denied. To do so would not have made her civil rights 
claims in the first action untimely. Her voluntary conduct in prematurely filing her prior 
action does not prevent its dismissal from barring this lawsuit concerning the same factual 
issues. To do otherwise would be to permit the plaintiff, by her own actions, to create 
piecemeal litigation contrary to Utah's public policy. "Having failed to raise the issue in 
the initial proceeding, Nebeker waived any opportunity to bring it later either before the 
district court or in another forum. This decision is supported by sound policy 
considerations. To begin, to hold otherwise would create procedural confusion and 
piecemeal litigation, as demonstrated by this very case." Nebeker v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n. 2001 UT 74,1ffll8-l9, 34 P.3d 180. 
Just as a plaintiff must file a notice of claim and have it denied before she can file 
an action under Utah law, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination and receive a 
"right to sue" letter before filing a Title VII action. The federal courts have rejected the 
plaintiffs claim in the Title VII context. Where a plaintiff has filed a Title VII claim, 
after having other claims dismissed on the merits, the courts have applied res judicata and 
refused the argument that the Title VII claims could not have been joined in the prior 
actions because the plaintiffs were still awaiting the prerequisite "right to sue" letter. 
Havercombe v. Dep't of Educ. 250 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001) (lack of "right to sue" letter 
for later in time Title VII claims did not prevent them from being barred by plaintiffs 
failure to raise them in prior action); Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan. 244 F.3d 708, 
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714-15 (9th Cir. 2001) (Title VII claims not exempt from res judicata even though 
plaintiffs claimed they were barred from joining such claims in the prior action because 
they had not received a "right to sue" letter); Jang v. United Tech. Corp.. 206 F.3d 1147, 
1149 (11th Cir. 2000) (ADA claims were subject to bar of res judicata even though 
plaintiff had sought, but not received, a "right to sue" letter before filing the prior action); 
Churchill v. Star Enter.. 183 F.3d 184, 191-92 (3rd Cir. 1999) (all claims that required 
"right to sue" letter were barred from being litigated in second action even though no 
letter was obtained during first litigation); Rivers v. Barberton Bd. of Educ 143 F.3d 
1029, 1032-33 (6th Cir. 1998) (permitting two suits - one under Title VII after the demise 
of the prior litigation containing the remainder of the plaintiffs claims - would be both 
inefficient and unduly burdensome); Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp.. 972 F.2d 36, 39-41 
(2nd Cir. 1992) (Title VII claim barred even though no "right to sue" letter received before 
the statute of limitations would have run on other claims). 
Plaintiff could have waited and filed one action including all of her claims. 
Instead, she brought the prior action that was dismissed on the merits. She cannot now 
bring a second action against the same defendant and avoid the bar of res judicata by 
claiming that her state law claims had yet to be denied at the time she filed her prior 
action. Instead, Lundahl failed to even file a notice of claim until after she had filed her 
prior action against Judge Harding. R. 431-35,453-64. The trial court correctly 
dismissed this action on the basis of res judicata and that decision should be affirmed on 
appeal. 
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VI. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST MIKE TRONIER ARE 
BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
The plaintiffs claims against defendant Tronier, other than the new claims 
addressed above, relate back to the subject of the prior lawsuit against Judge Harding that 
was dismissed on the basis of judicial immunity. The prior action was dismissed on the 
merits. All of the claims addressed in the prior litigation are barred by collateral estoppel, 
or issue preclusion. 
The four elements of issue preclusion are: (i) the party against whom issue 
preclusion is asserted must have been a party to or in privity with a party to 
the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the prior adjudication must 
be identical to the one presented in the instant action; (iii) the issue in the 
first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) 
the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
In Re General Determination of Rights to the Use of all Water. Murdock v. Springville 
Municipal Corp.. 1999 UT 39 f 18, 982 P.2d 65. There can be no argument but that the 
first element has been met. The same Holli Lundahl who is the plaintiff in this matter 
was the plaintiff before Judge Tervort in the Fourth District Court in Case No. 
000401252. R. 453-64. 
The second element, that the issues be identical, is also met. It is not necessary 
that the legal question be the same in both actions, only that the factual issues be the 
same. Robertson v. Campbell. 674 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1983): see also Berry v. Berry. 
738 P.2d 246, 248 (Utah App. 1987); Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 
387, 390 (Utah App. 1987). As stated above, the same reasoning that provided Judge 
Harding with absolute judicial immunity from the plaintiffs claims, indicates that the 
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judge's clerk would be entitled to the same immunity for his conduct in working with his 
judge. 
The third element, full and fair litigation, requires only that flfthe parties must 
receive notice, reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise them of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.1" 
Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't of Corrections. 942 P.2d 933, 939 (Utah 1997). 
The plaintiff was heard and permitted to argue against the dismissal of her previous 
action. R. 441. She clearly had notice of the action and had an opportunity to present her 
objections to its dismissal. 
Finally, the prior action ended with a final judgment being entered against 
Lundahl. That judgment was affirmed on appeal by this Court. R. 437-41. 
Because all four elements of collateral estoppel have been met, the plaintiffs 
action against Deputy Clerk Mike Tronier was barred thereby and properly dismissed. 
Plaintiff was not free to refile her action, but is bound by collateral estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, defendants Judge Ray Harding, Jr. and Deputy Clerk 
Mike Tronier ask this Court to affirm the dismissal of this action. 
DEFENDANTS DO NOT DESIRE ORAL ARGUMENT 
OR A PUBLISHED OPINION 
Judge Harding and Deputy Clerk Tronier do not request oral argument and a 
published opinion in this matter. The questions raised in this appeal, having already been 
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decided by this Court in published opinions, are not such that oral argument or a 
published opinion are necessary, though the defendants desire to participate in oral 
argument if such is held by the Court. 
Respectfully submitted this ^- day of January, 2003. 
^J ^ 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Defendants-Appellees, postage prepaid, to the following on this the of 
November, 2O0£: 
Holli Lundahl 
200 E. Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
Holli Lundahl, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Honorable Ray Harding, Jr., 
Defendant and Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20010049-CA 
F I L E D 
May 3, 2001 
ll 2001 UTApp142 |l 
Fourth District, Provo Department 
The Honorable Louis G. Tervort 
Attorneys: 
Holli Lundahl, Midvale, Appellant Pro Se 
Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Orme. 
PER CURIAM: 
Lundahl appeals the trial court's November 15, 2000 order granting Judge Harding's motion to dismiss and 
denying her motion for summary judgment as well as the December 27, 2000 order denying her motion for new 
judgment. We affirm. 
Lundahl seeks to hold Judge Harding liable for decisions he made in case number 990402021, Fourth District 
Court. However, a trial judge acting within the scope of his authority is not liable for or subject to suit for his 
decisions. Se_e Christensen v. Ward. 916 F.2d 1462,1473 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[Jjudges are absolutely immune from 
suit on any claim based in the conduct of their office, including allegations that a decision is erroneous, malicious, 
or in excess of their judicial authority."). Judge Harding was acting in his judicial capacity over a case within his 
jurisdiction and thus, is immune from suit. Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1999), upon which Lundahl relies, only 
allows prospective injunctive relief against a judge when he has violated a declaratory decree or when no other 
declaratory relief is available. Lundahl seeks retroactive relief, has not shown that Judge Harding violated a 
declaratory decree, and has other remedies, namely, filing a direct appeal if she is dissatisfied with the final 
judgment in federal court. 
Affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
